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SALT
SALT TWO
SESSION I
A- 76

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U.S. SALT DELEGATION
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

DATE: December 8, 1972

TIME: 1:30 - 2:30 p.m.

PLACE: Soviet Mission,
Geneva

SUBJECT: SALT

PARTICIPANTS: US

USSR

Dr. Lawrence D. Weiler

Mr. V. P. Karpov

Mr. L. A. Masterkov

The following points of possible interest resulted from the luncheon conversation with Karpov and Masterkov

Prospects for SALT TWO

Karpov asked me if I were pessimistic or optimistic about the current discussions and the prospects for future negotiations. I said I had not been encouraged by the add-on-to-the-Interim-Agreement approach of the Soviet side, which besides being non-acceptable to the U.S. side seemed to be an effort to put off to some future date consideration of the hard issues to be faced. Karpov said he was more optimistic than I. He said adding to the Interim Agreement would help prospects for future negotiations and argued that what I had called the add-on approach was not all of the Soviet position. He said both sides would have to evaluate the total situation after the end of this first session.

Qualitative Limitations

Karpov said the Soviet's third item on restraint was important for our negotiations and that there were also other elements to be considered, such as other kinds of limitations. When I asked what he meant by the latter reference he said I should study Academician Shchukin's statement on qualitative limitations involving MIRVs made at today's mini-plenary. I said I had not been present at the mini-plenary and asked Karpov to summarize Shchukin's statement. Karpov declined to do so saying that it was better that I look at the exact words Shchukin had used as it was an important statement.

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When I asked Karpov whether the Soviets envisaged any effect on current Soviet programs of their restraint proposal, he said the proposal was for restraint to be applied in a mutual manner and details could be discussed when both sides were agreed this was an approach which held some promise. He refused to be drawn out further.

MBFR

Masterkov, who appeared to wish to avoid substantive discussion, said he was finally getting more confidence in his knowledge of SALT matters. He said he had done some work on "MBFR" before turning to SALT. He said he would like to return to that subject since it was an interesting and important question. In response to my question on how the Soviets planned to organize within the government for MBFR, he said organizational arrangements had not yet been decided upon but that there were committees already studying certain problems. He said he thought the Disarmament Section would play an important role. In response to his query, I said ACDA would be involved in MBFR but probably in a somewhat different way than it had been in SALT. Masterkov said the Soviets tend not to have as formal arrangements on responsibility for disarmament matters as the U.S. He said they work more through ad hoc task forces.

Other Matters

Karpov said he planned to continue with the Soviet SALT Delegation even though he continued to be assigned to what he called "our policy planning staff." He said he planned to bring his wife with him for the next session of SALT.

Masterkov said that Shustov, who with Timerbaev and Grinevsky is a deputy bureau chief, was now dealing only with non-disarmament UN matters.

When I asked if Igor Usachev would be returning to the CCD, perhaps as Roschin's replacement, Masterkov said he did not know what Usachev would be doing in the future.

LDW
LDWeiler:bls
December 12, 1972

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